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Abstract
We discuss the concept of promises within a framework that can be applied
to either humans or technology. We compare promises to the more established
notion of obligations and find promises to be both simpler and more effective at
reducing uncertainty about multi-agent behaviour.
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1 Introduction
This paper1 is about the usefulness and importance of promises as a concept. For
something that is so abundant in daily life, the concept of a promise has been given
1This paper is a revision of the paper arXived on http://arxiv.org/abs/0810.3294v4.
In this version remarks on the institution of promising in the context of Philosophy of Law have been
added, as well as a reference to work on the anthropology of promising. Various small mistakes were
remedied as well.
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only a limited treatment in academic literature, and then mainly in the areas of philos-
ophy, law, and economics. Promises give way more often to the idea of obligations,
indeed many authors quickly do away with promises and replace them with apparent
obligations as if this were a necessity. No doubt this tendency originates in historical
matters, but it is unfortunate as promises have a plausible and practical value both in
their mundane meaning for humans and in an extended interpretation that can apply to
machines and other inanimate objects.
The concept of a promise is not a difficult one – in fact we claim it to be a simpler
concept than an obligation – but it requires some care, and it leads to some compli-
cations. In this paper we present our understanding of promises and explain why in
some application areas there are both practical and theoretical advantages to their use
over obligations. To make our case unambiguously, we ask the forbearance of readers
in presenting the fundamentals and motivations at some length.
We assume the existence of an emerging topic of promise theory, to which we
hope to make a contribution with our paper. The development of promise theory is
stil in an initial phase. We position promise theory as a branch of informal logic.
We mention [23, 20, 5] and [18] as introductions to informal logic and [39] for an
example of how informal logic may be applied in computing. Promise theory has been
specifically developed with applications in distributed systems in mind, but not limited
to applications in informatics.
Promise theory may therefore be viewed alternatively as a topic in theoretical in-
formatics with foundations in informal logic and with a potential for application in
management science. Promise theory presupposes a theory of agents. It draws upon
the classical notion of reciprocity, that is agents modeling one another recursively
(see [16]). For the notion of an agent we refer to [26].
2 A motivation
For surely all readers the notion of a promise will be quite familiar. Our experience
of promises might be both positive and negative, for many promises that are made are
never kept. Below are examples of the kinds of statements we intend to call promises.
Let us begin with everyday statements and progress gradually to the kinds of abstract
promises that we would like to use in a variety of technical scenarios.
• I promise you that I will walk the dog.
• I promise you that I fed your cat while you were away.
• We promise to accept cash payments.
• We promise to accept validated credit cards.
• I promise to lock the door when I leave.
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• I promise not to lock the door when I leave.
These examples are quite uncontroversial. They are easily found in every day life,
spoken by humans or posted on signs. We now want to argue that it is useful to extend
the notion of promises to inanimate objects that have been designed or programmed to
behave in a certain manner. This is not a very large step, but it is easier to make with
some examples.
Consider the following promises that might be made in the world of Information
Technology:
• The Internet Service Provider promises to deliver broadband Internet at a fixed
speed for a fixed monthly payment.
• The security officer promises that the system will conform to security require-
ments.
• The support personnel promise to be available by pager 24 hours a day.
• Support staff promise to reply to queries within 24 hours.
Again these are straightforward promises, which could be described further to be more
specific. The final promise could also be restated in more abstract terms, transferring
the promise to an abstract entity: “the help desk”:
• The company help-desk promises to reply to service requests within 24 hours.
2.1 Promises about a piece of technology
This latter example illustrates the way that we transfer the intentions of promises to
‘entities’ that we consider to be responsible by association. It is a small step from this
transference to a more general assignment of promises to individual components in a
piece of technology. For example, we can document the properties of the following
tools and technologies in the spirit of this argument:
• I am a logic gate and promise to transform a TRUE signal into a FALSE signal
and vice versa.
• I am a command line interpreter and promise to accept input and execute com-
mands from the user.
• I am a router and promise to accept packets from a list of authorized IP addresses.
• I am a compliance monitor and promise to verify and automatically repair the
state of the system based on this description of system configuration and policy.
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• I am a high availability server and I promise you service delivery with 99.9999%
availability.
From these example we see that the range of application of promises is quite gen-
eral. Indeed such promises are all around us in everyday life, both in mundane cloth-
ing as well as in technical disciplines. Statements about engineering specifications can
also profitably be considered as promises, even though we might not ordinarily think
of them in this way.
When an electronics engineer looks in a component catalogue and sees ‘resistors’
for sale promising to have resistance of 500 Ohms to within a tolerance of 5%, we
do not argue about who made this promise or whether the resistor is capable of inde-
pendent thought. The coloured bands on the component are a sufficient expression of
this promise, and we accept it by association. By this reasoning, we propose that the
concept of a promise should be understood in a way which allows for all of these uses.
2.2 Range of promiser types
With the expansion of the use of promise as just advocated goes a rather large range of
types of promisers that we will admit, we mention:
• Objects (tools, instruments) without intelligence,
• Non-human animate agents,
• Intelligent artificial agents,
• Human agents.
The definitions below are intended to apply with intelligent artificial agents2 acting as
promisers and also in the case of promising human agents. The extension of these defi-
nitions to the cases of objects without intelligence and to non-human animate agents is
not carried out in detail, but the idea is that in such cases an intelligent agent (either hu-
man or artificial) is imagined which promises on behalf of these objects or agents. The
details of the concept of promising on behalf of another entity will not be considered
below.3
2.3 Promises and reduction of uncertainty
Promises are entities that we use to form expectations of the behaviour of all manner of
things. Such expectations contribute to reducing our uncertainty about their behaviour,
2About appropriate definitions of the concept of an (intelligent) agents a significant literature has
been accumulated in the field of artificial intelligence.
3Developing a definition of promise that applies uniformly for a wide range of promiser types is left
as a conceptual problem for future work.
and this can apply as much to technology as to humans. We therefore take it as given
that the concept of a promise is a useful one, although still in need of a stable defini-
tion that is suitable as a basis for promise theory, and we consider next how one can
formalize promises in the simplest and least assuming way.
Producing a promise may be more effective in reducing uncertainty than putting
forward an assertion that is stated with more certainty. Indeed if an expectation about
a piece of technology or about an human or artificial agent is asserted with absolute
certainty, or merely with some quantified probability of being valid, the question im-
mediately arises how that knowledge has been obtained, thereby possibly increasing
uncertainty rather than reducing it.
Such existential questions do not arise within a community of users for a piece of
technology that has been delivered in combination with a bundle of promises to its user,
who may simply react to disappointing performance with a reduction of trust in the
promiser. Future promises from that same source will be received with less optimism.
Conversely, if the piece of equipment outperforms the promised performance that fact
may lead to increased trust in the original promiser, causing increased confidence in
forthcoming promises by the same agent.
2.4 The logical status of promises: trust/reputation backed action
Defining what a promise is can hardly be done without examining definitions or at
least approximate descriptions of several similar notions. Related but different notions
are these:
• Taking a decision (role backed action).
• Belief based prediction (a belief backed action).
• Science based prediction (a science backed action).
• Announcing a legal claim (legal theory and case history backed action).
• Announcing a mathematical conjecture (reputation/trust backed action).
• Specification of properties of an artifact (reputation/trust backed action).
• Expression of a mathematical fact (a logic backed action).
• Expression of a quantified expectation (reputation/trust backed action).
A promise is an action with a primary and a secondary effect. The primary effect
concerns promisees and other observers who may adapt their actions and plans in
accordance with becoming aware of the content of a promise. A secondary effect
reflects upon a promiser and impacts on the trust or reputation that the promiser enjoys
among those who noticed a promise being issued. Promising is an action backed by
credibility, and trust, the latter mediated by reputation.
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Other forms of backing for an action or an utterance exist as well: if a mathe-
matical theorem with its proof is communicated and the theorem is found to lead to
inconsistencies with existing theory that fact will impact the trust one has in the proof
rather than in the agent who puts forward the proof. Similarly if a scientific claim is
found to contradict new findings the science that justifies the claim will be scrutinized
once more, rather than its originator.4
The separation of a notion of promise from related notions like prediction (with and
without quantified expectation), conjecture, legal claim, and decision will require sys-
tematic work that depends on the definitions of those other notions. That dependency
makes it infeasible to analyze these matters in detail within our paper. An exception
is the notion of a prediction. Predictions can be understood liberally (e.g. predictions
made by artificial agents) just as promises. A prediction differs from a promise in that
its assessment involves no past, present, or future activity or participation of its origi-
nator. A prediction cannot create an obligation for its creator to comply with the body
of the prediction, though issuing a prediction may create a responsibility to remedy
expected adverse consequences of the predicted event or state of affairs. Predictions
that don’t materialize are likely to be held against the reputation of their originators,
however.
2.5 Extending promise to prediction
When designing a theory of promises meant for use in informatics some discrepancy
with the concept of promise as used in that theory and the colloquial (or rather philo-
sophical) use of the term promise may be acceptable. Once a theory of promises
takes a formalized form dedicated to a specific application area, such as for instance
distributed computing, the emergence of a gap between a mainstream informal under-
standing of promise and its meaning in that particular theory is almost unavoidable.
With this in mind it may be acceptable in principle that a theory of promises includes
includes predictions under promises as well in spite of the fact that a meaningful dis-
tinction can be made.
In this way a tour operator can promise (rather than predict) a client that a trip next
week will profit from good whether conditions,
3 The concept of a promise
Because of their overriding ubiquity, and practical importance, one would like to have
an account of promises that captures their key properties and explains related concepts
4Of course repeated findings of problems with mathematical or scientific results of the same agent
will invoke questions about that agent’s credibility, and so will the discovery of methodological flaws in
that agents working processes. The point we make is that in logic or science backed action the logical
or scientific backing of an action itself can be scrutinized, an option that is absent with trust/reputation
backed actions.
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such as commitment, obligation and intention. There is a surprising lack of discussion
about the meaning of promises in the literature as far as we can tell. Although the
concept or its relatives have been mentioned in such diverse areas from logic, law and
philosophy to economics, information science and computing, there is no agreement
on what constitutes the semantic content of the terms or if there is even more than a
tacit relationship between promise, commitment, obligation etc. The most attention
has been given to the concept of obligations especially in the area of deontic logic. We
believe on the other hand that the philosophical implications of promises are far wider
than is generally assumed and that there is both a need and a practical importance to
clarify them once and for all. Indeed, we will show that notwithstanding our lengthy
definitions the concept of a promise is simpler than that of an obligation.
3.1 Implicit promise versus explicit promise
By far the most ubiquitous usage of the term promise is in phrases like “the promise
of solar energy” or “the promise of nano-technology”. Such promises are implicit in
the sense that the existence of a promiser is not assumed and the word promise means
approximately: expectation of usability and impact, where an author using the term
usually intends to contribute to an assessment of the mentioned expectation.
In contrast an explicit promise comes about from an action performed by a promiser
in an appropriate context. We will only focus on explicit promises below and we will
assume by default that promises are explicit.
3.2 Existing views on promises
We will survey some views that other authors have put forward on promises, henceforth
understood as explicit promises.
Atiyah [1] suggests that any promise leads to an obligation to keep that promise
that is motivated by the threat of tit for tat reprisals. Reciprocation is thus coupled to
the idea of promises immediately, which seems to hop over fundamental definitions
directly to a discussion of the economics of keeping promises. The obligations are to
avoid injury and to reciprocate goodwill. It might be discussed whether incentives are
the same as obligations. Atiyah points out however that promising something cannot
be necessarily used to create obligation at will. Promises might cause obligations but
they can also represent obligations that already exist, i.e. to show commitment to an
existing obligation to pay the price of something. e.g. I promise to pay the bearer
the sum of 1 pound (in gold). This is only an existing admission of moral obligation.
Atiyah maintains, plausibly, that the motivation for promising has changed throughout
history. When people make promises, their intentions are culturally bound. Thus a
Victorian gentleman’s conception of a promise might not fit with that of a present-day
child who promises to be home in time for dinner.
Cartwright takes Atiyah’s view and asks what might be the point of promises if
not to generate the assumed obligation [10]. Why do people bother to make promises
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about things to which they are already obliged? His answer includes the idea that it
is a face-saving measure: to mitigate their humility, suggesting that an obligation is
interpreted as a kind of attack or levy of force? Alternatively, perhaps the obligation
to keep one’s promises weighs heavier than the original obligation (I promise you
my word as a gentleman not to kill you, even though the law says I am forbidden).
Referring to Fried [14], Cartwright points out that the economics of contractual tit-
for-tat suggested by Atiyah is tied to promises and not to the obligations they might
confer.
The idea that promises are an economic driver of contracts or agreements as bilat-
eral exchanges of promises is continued in the work of Gilbert [15]. Then Carrillo and
Dewatripont have argued that promises can best be understood as a market mechanism
for reducing the uncertainty in a moral-hazard game [9]. This work does not seem to
have been pursued. Does a promise increase the likelihood of voluntary cooperation?
A number of other works mention the concept of promises in the context of game
theory also. In these, the concept of a promise is tacitly assumed to be related to the
probability of choosing a particular game strategy.
Scanlon [30] meticulously analyses how and to what extent promises give rise to
obligations under a variety of combinations of additional assumptions. In his analysis
morality plays a important role and it is implicitly assumed that promiser and promisee
are human beings capable of moral reflection.
Zhao et al. [40] provide a comprehensive modal logic incorporating beliefs, ca-
pabilities and promises. Unfortunately it is difficult from that work to extant a clear
intuition of the concept of a promise that the authors had in mind. It seems that this dif-
ficulty is in part caused by the formalist approach taken. In Framinan and Leisten [13]
order promising is displayed as a standard technical term in industrial workflow man-
agement, while at the same time that use of the term promise is considered lacking a
sufficiently clear definition.
Promises are often treated in the context of agreements, see for instance Schein-
man [31]. Agreements may be constructed out of mutual promises. But promises may
exist without being part of agreements.
3.3 Promises in distributed computing
More recently, a different motivation for promises was introduced by Burgess in the
context of distributed management [6]. Rather than focusing on morals or even eco-
nomics as the principal motivator, Burgess uses the promise as a measure of ‘voluntary
cooperation’ as a way of circumventing what we consider to be fundamental problems
with logics of obligation for determining system behaviour. Voluntary cooperation is
seen as a way of simplifying constraints and avoiding many-worlds paradoxes. He
pursues the argument further by emphasizing the role of autonomy of the parts, and ar-
gues for a ‘promise theory’ in which every component in a system that can have unique
information or independent action should be viewed as axiomatically autonomous [7].
Any cooperation or even subordination of the parts that comes about in an organized
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system must then be understood as the result of ‘honouring’ purely voluntary promises
to do so. Burgess argues that no matter what one believes about the power to oblige
(even soldiers can refuse to follow orders), voluntary cooperation can be used as a prag-
matic engineering methodology for mapping out the complexity of a control problem
in a way that is invariant with respect to centralization or decentralization of systems.
In computer science, particularly the field of Multi-Agent Systems the concept of
commitments has been used for some time [37, 38]. It has been suggested that promises
and commitments are the same. However, we shall show that this is not the case. More
seriously, the sense in which the term commitment is used in such discussions is more
stylized than purposely considered and can only benefit from the discussion in this
paper.
3.4 Promises subject to product/process ambiguity?
Issuing a promise is an event, and one may say that A promised when A issued a
promise. More common is to view a promise as the outcome, that is a description
of what has been promised, rather than as an event. Nevertheless to some degree
the notion of a promise is subject to product/process ambiguity as described in [17]
and further references cited in that paper. Although [17] discusses the notion of an
argument, its conclusions may hold in the case of promising as well. In particular
the result of issuing a promise may be the awareness that a promise has been issued,
which is rather remote form a conventional understanding of “product”. The ambiguity
is perhaps even deeper because after having been issued a promise creates a process
of credibility and trust assessment and various other reasoning processes, of which a
textual description of “what has been promised” constitutes merely an abstraction. If
awareness is understood as a process rather than as a state the matter becomes quite
comparable to the case of an argument.
4 Modeling the structure of a promise
Consider the following intuitive idea of what a promise might be: A promise is an
announcement of fact or behaviour by a promiser to a promisee, observed by a number
of witnesses (referred to as the scope of the promise), whose outcome has yet to be
assessed.
The promiser and promisee are both assumed to be ‘agents’, i.e. humans or inan-
imate objects to which we attach identity in the story of promises. This general de-
scription fits the examples that we have already given and gives some clues as to the
constitution of a promise, but it also opens up a number of questions that need an-
swering. Already we can see that this apparently basic definition rests on a number of
assumptions: that we can observe the outcomes of behaviours and that the outcome of
a promise is clear at some single moment of time in the future, to be measured and ver-
ified by an observer. A full account of this might include a theory of measurement, but
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we wish to avoid this level of detail as it binds us to too many details that have nothing
directly to do with the issue. Let us instead try to understand to essential characteristics
for promises and consider what distinguishes a promise from related matters, such as
obligations, commitments and other terms.
The model world in which we formulate promises must have the following charac-
teristics.
• There must be agents in order for promises to exist.
• There must be a promiser (or source agent).
• There must be a promisee (or recipient agent) which might be the same as the
source.
• There must be a body which describes the nature of the promise.
We might summarize these attributes with a notation as in [6]:
promiser
body
−→ promisee (1)
• We can leave the body unspecified, but it must consist of a quality (a type, topic
or subject for the promise) and a quantifier (which indicates how much of the
realm of possibility for that subject is being promised). For example: promise
quality: “travel to work”, promise quantity “on Monday and Friday each week”.
Finally, what is implicit in the above is that a promise requires the transmission of a
message, or at least documentation in some kind of physical form, e.g. a speech act,
or a written statement, else it cannot be made known to anyone except the promiser. A
promise must therefore have documentation that is made intentionally or otherwise.
What then is a promise before we write it down? We shall refer to this as a possible
intention. An intention is the basic formulation of a course of behaviour, which is made
internally by (or on behalf of) an agent. When an intention is made public, it becomes
a promise. If an intention is documented or leaked in some way then anyone has a
right to assume it is a promise.
We take it as given that there has to be a source for every promise. A promiser does
not have to reveal its identity of course, so witnesses to the promise might not know
its source e.g. consider the anonymous threat. There is no reason to deny the existence
of a source however. The lack of such information about a promiser is simply a defect
in the knowledge of the receiving agent, but one would normally prefer to assume a
consistent picture of promises and infer the existence of an anonymous promiser. This
justifies our postulating the source.
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4.1 Promises as documented apparent intentions
Stoljar [34] writes that a promise is an announcement of an intention. and he argues
that any offer must be a promise as well. Indeed a key characteristic of a promise is that
it documents an intention, so let us explore the idea of intentions in more detail. In-
tentions turn out to be a lowest common denominator for all of the concepts discussed
in this paper and thus have a special importance. Unfortunately from a document one
cannot conclude to what extent the intention expressed in it is real. That indeterminacy
gives rise to an additional complexity of our definitions.
Since promises involve communication we require a notion of the spread of infor-
mation amongst the agents. We use the term scope (as used in computer science) for
this. A scope is simply defined to be a set of agents. For example, the scope of a
promise would typically refer to the promiser and a list of witnesses to the promise,
e.g. those who heard to utterance or those who saw the written document.
4.2 Intentions
In the realm of all possible formulations about agent behaviour the concept of an in-
tention stands out as an important foundation.
Term 1 (Current intention of an agent A) A current intention of an agent A is de-
scription of a possible behaviour, or goal, or objective, or state of affairs, that is con-
templated by A with the understanding that it can be and preferably (for A) will be
brought to realization.
Term 2 (Possible intention for an agent A) A possible intention for an agent A is a
description of a possible behaviour, or goal, or objective, or state of affairs, that may
but need not currently (at the time of qualifying the description) be contemplated or
preferably brought to realization by A, and which might be in some (possibly different)
circumstances a current intention of A.
Obviously a current intention is also a possible intention. But if an utterance of A
announces a possible intention that need not be a current intention, it may only appear
to be a current intention.
The components of an intention are as follows: a source agent who formulates
the intention, a target agent if the intention is directed at a potential subject, and a
body which explains the quality and quantity of the intention. Only the source of an
intention knows about the intention, i.e. the scope of an intention is the source only.
There are no witnesses.
Now we must be careful: the set of all possible intentions should be distinguished
from actual instances of intentions selected by an particular agent. We shall some-
times use the phrase “possible intentions” to mean this full set of abstract entities to
emphasize when we wish to signify a general description of behaviour rather than an
individual agent’s decision.
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4.3 Commitments
To commit to something is to make a decision in favour of it. The issue of commit-
ments is therefore about the favourization of intentions. Commitment is a personal
decision and has nothing to do with physical representation or communication, thus
the issue of commitment precedes any discussion of promises. A commitment has a
source, a target and a body, i.e. it is an intention. Like an intention it has no physical
representation and does not have a non-trivial scope.
Once an intention becomes a commitment we often assume that some point of no
return has been passed in the act of committing (deciding) about the particular inten-
tion. i.e. adding the intention to a list of commitments. For example, in a game of
chicken in which two cars drive towards each other to see which one will swerve off
first, a driver has committed to not swerving when the decision to not back down has
been made [32]. This might have certain irreversible consequences, but it is difficult
to generalize the idea of irreversibility in examples of this kind. What commitment
essentially boils down to is the elevation of some intention beyond an arbitrary thresh-
old. In other words, in the universe of intentions there is a subset of these which we
may call commitments.
Term 3 (Commitment) Commitments are current intentions that we are committed
to. We may call them intended intentions, or equivalently real intentions, intentions
that we hold, or committed intentions. The commitment of an intention exceeds its
merely being current in that it is stable and persists in time until some achievement
of the intention will take place or until some overruling considerations invalidate the
commitment.
When passing by a shop one may feel a current intention to buy a nice gadget,
only to be relieved of that intention (or rather its currency) after noticing its price. If
however, the price is quite good, but the shop is closed at the time of passing along,
then a current intention to buy the same item can become activated with the status
of a commitment, only to be terminated when the item has been acquired or when
unexpected problems turn out to stand in the way.
4.4 Expressing intentions
Making intentions known to other agents is the essence (meta-intention) of promising.
We will develop some terminology for such acts of expression. An intention is not
necessarily announced by the agent holding it to any other agents. Indeed, we may
now define any intention that is announced to be a promise. Conversely we notice
that any promise that has not been announced is merely a possible intention. Some
intentions are desirable while others are absolutely undesirable and an agent might
never choose them, yet they are possible intentions nevertheless. The fact that such
behaviours can be intended is enough for them to qualify as possible intentions.
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Intentions must always be thought of as belonging to a specific agent. Those in-
tentions which are actual plans of the agent are called its commitments. Other phrases
for a commitment that we may use are: intended intention, or real intention.
Due to the static nature of our account we pay no attention to the process by which
an intention might become a commitment or vice versa.
Term 4 (Intention utterance) An agent a produces an intention utterance if A pro-
duces an expression of a description of a possible intention.
What matters for our discussion on promises is intention utterances that seem to be
real. That leads to the idea of an apparent intention utterance.
Term 5 (Apparent Intention utterance) An utterance expressing a possible inten-
tion (of a principal agent) with the contextual appearance of an intention. Apparent
intentions, may be drawn from the following range:
Real intention: (alternatively: commitment, true intention, or intended intention) what
is announced corresponds to wha the agent expects that will happen, or that
(s)he will do, or what holds or what will hold.
In other words the apparent intention is real if it is a commitment (and therefore
current).
Incidental intention: (alternatively: non-committing current intention) what is an-
nounced corresponds to why the agent expects that will happen, or that (s)he
will do, or what holds or what will hold, but only a the time of expression.
Indifferent intention: (alternatively: quasi-intention) the issuer has no current inten-
tion corresponding to the utterance, and no current conflicting intention either.
An indifferent intention is currently contemplated as a possible behaviour, goal,
objective, or state of affairs, but its bringing about is not preferred, and thus an
indifferent intention is not a current intention.
Deceptive intention: (also: misleading intention) the announcement might seem to be
real for an audience in scope but it is a lie from the perspective of the promiser.
A deceptive intention is incompatible regarding realization with a current inten-
tion, though this may be only known to the principal agent.
Invalid intention: (alternatively: manifest lie) all observers may notice a discrepancy
between what is announced and the facts.
The invalidity of an invalid intention will become clear to agents in scope of that
utterance.
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The idea of an apparent intention is that at face value it is like an intention from
the perspective of an observer but there is a considerable degree of freedom in connec-
tion with a so-called underlying intention, the existence of which we postulate in the
following definition.
Term 6 (Underlying intention (of an apparent intention utterance)) Given an ap-
parent intention utterance of an agent, there is an underlying intention (which need
not be comprised in the same utterance) as well. We will distinguish five cases, corre-
sponding to the case distinction of intention utterances:
Real intention: The underlying intention of a real intention is that same intention.
Incidental intention: The underlying intention of an incidental intention is that same
intention which is known to be consistent but is non-committing as well.
Indifferent intention: The underlying intention of an indifferent intention is empty.
Deceptive intention: The underlying intention of a deceptive intention differs signifi-
cantly from the (deceptive) intention.
Invalid intention: The underlying intention of an invalid intention differs noticeably
(for observing agents) from the (invalid) intention.
We will assume the agents keep underlying intentions private. Otherwise new lev-
els of complexity emerge as underlying intentions may turn out to split over the same
distinction of four cases recursively.
4.5 Promises
A promise is the physical publication of an intention within a certain scope. This
suggests that there must be some agent to observe the promise and its outcome which
in turn requires the expensive notion of a theory of observation so we shall tackle this
issue separately (see section 5.3).
Term 7 (Promise) A promise is an apparent intention of an agent, (the promiser or
promising agent) the utterance of which has been documented within a scope that goes
beyond the promiser.
According to the definition of intention utterances, a promise brings with it an
apparent intention and an underlying intention, and five cases can be distinguished
for promises: real, incidental, indifferent, deceptive, and invalid.
Promises thus have scope. Formally intentions also have a scope, but the scope of
an intention held by an agent is by definition limited to the agent (source) itself. An
intention could be leaked deliberately (e.g. to the press, in order to influence someone).
This might be a form of leverage, or an attempt to impose an obligation on some party
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in scope. However, at the instant an intention expands in scope to encompass more
agents it becomes a promise. A so-called letter of intent, for example, is a promise
rather than merely an intention.
The time aspect of promises presents further challenges. Intentions can become
outdated by events. An event which is found to fulfill an intention documents the
implicit promise, since one must admit to the intention in a wider scope. Conversely,
the documentation for a promise does not have to last for ever; if documentation of a
promise disappears completely, it reverts to being an intention. A promise to oneself
is in excess of a mere intention because it has been documented.
The distinction between the promisee and the scope of the promise is key to under-
standing promises. Suppose someone intends to arrange a surprise birthday party for
their friend. Initially this is an intention. The intention is written in a diary or men-
tioned to a third party and it becomes a promise. The target is not in the scope of the
promise however, so the promise remains unknown to the jubilant. However, suppose
that before telling anyone else, the promiser destroys all evidence of the promise by
tearing out the page of the diary, effectively withdrawing knowledge of the promise,
then the promise reverts to being just an intention. But as long as knowledge of the
promise remains “out there” in the world, it remains a promise that has been made.
Term 8 (Keeping a promise (relative to an observing agent)) A promise is kept, for
the perspective of an agent A (e.g. the promisee), if an action is performed or a state
of affairs is reached that complies, according to A’s assessment or observation, with
the body of the promise. It is plausible but not strictly needed to require that once a
promise is kept some causal relation with promiser behaviour can be found.
Although in a static theory of promises the keeping of promises is not center-stage,
having some some characterization of it is helpful. Critical to the definition of keeping
a promise is relativity w.r.t. the observing agent. If a promiser assesses a promise p
as having been kept while a promisee B, perhaps supported by other agents in scope
of the promise doesn’t agree, that state of affairs casts no doubt on the status of the
promise p as such. On the contrary this situation may have been precisely what A had
in mind when issuing promise p.
Term 9 (Keeping a promise (in absolute terms)) A promise is kept in absolute terms,
if it is kept according to all agents in its scope.
Term 10 (Broken promise) A promise is broken if after it has been issued a state is
reached at which the promise has not been kept, from any conceivable (though reason-
able) perspective, and from which it will certainly not be kept anymore either, again
from any conceivable (though reasonable) perspective that an agent in its scope mint
have.
We will now discuss the relation between promises and obligation in some detail.
16
Term 11 (Promissory obligation) With each promise of an agent A an obligation is
connected, the so-called promissory obligation. It is that obligation to which the agent
has become obliged by making the promise.
Promissory obligations are an important tenet of the philosophy of promises, and we
do not deny their existence. This definition allows significant freedom. It can be read
as follows: a promise theory will allow for a notion of a promissory obligation. That
notion may be doe weak that it provides empty promissory obligations only. It is not
assumed that a promissory obligation explains a promise in terms of a philosophically
grounded concept of an obligation. However, we will oppose to what we call obliga-
tionism.
Term 12 (Obligationism) With obligationism we denote the viewpoint that (i) promises
are characterized by a unique capacity to (auto)generate an obligation (specifically the
promissory obligation) for the promising agent, and that (ii) the essence or content of
a promise is fully captured by its promissory obligation.
An argument in favor of obligationism is found if one assumes that the promissory
obligation captures the essence of the obligation so that the concept of a promise can
be reduced to that of an obligation. Obligations being known from deontic logic and
form various strands of philosophy, one may consider this reduction to constitute a
worthwhile simplification rendering the construct of a promise redundant. We don’t
support this argument.
Term 13 (Non-obligationism) With non-obligationism we denote the belief that obli-
gationism is false.
Term 14 (Strong non-obligationism) With strong non-obligationism we denote the
belief that obligationism is false and that in addition the concept of promise may be
accounted for without making use of the concept of an obligation.
Preferring non-obligationism over obligationism, and convinced of the relevance of
strong non-obligationism, we will propose a strongly non-obligationist conception of
promises. Arguments for (strong) non-obligationism have been detailed in [6].
Term 15 (Restricted strong non-obligationism) With restricted non-obligationism we
denote the belief that obligationism is false, and that for a large class of promises,
though not for all, the concept of promise may be accounted for without making use of
the concept of an obligation.
If in court a witness promises to tell the truth and nothing but the truth, an obligation
is created. Remarkably that obligation can only be created by means of a promise.
Restricted strong non-obligationism does not claim that this promise, though being
prior to its promissory obligation, can be fully understood without contemplating the
concept of an obligation.
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A recent argument can be found in [3] where payments in a peer-to-peer system
for financial transfer an store of value are considered autonomous actions to the ex-
tent that such payments cannot be obliged by definition. Payments can be promised
however, with the corresponding promissory obligation constituting no more than ac-
quiring some certainty that the payment could be effected if the agent wishes to do
so.
4.6 Deceptions – non-intended promises
Although we have distinguished five cases for promises, commitments stand out as
most important immediately followed by deceptions, with the other classes entering
the picture in order to have a complete story. We add some further comments on
deceptions.
Understanding deceptions (or lies) is also an important step in clarifying the rela-
tionship between intentions and promises, because it is possible for an agent to have
two different intentions in play at the same time: a commitment and an announced
intention (i.e. a promise) which are not compatible. Incompatibility means that striv-
ing for both intentions simultaneously is fruitless because their realizations cannot be
combined.
In a deception, there is always a source and always a target and the target cannot be
the same as the source, as an agent cannot (intentionally) deceive itself. Furthermore,
we maintain that the target of a deception must be in scope, so there must be a physical
documentation and hence a deception necessarily involves a promise and not merely
an intention.
Term 16 (Deception) A deception consists of two intentions: a documented intention
(i.e. a promise) and a non-documented commitment, which are incompatible.
The non-documented commitment will also be called the hidden intention.
In a deception the hidden intention is more important than the witnessed one one
and we might refer to it as the dominant intention. This simply expresses that it is a
commitment while the promise contains merely a “possible intention”. It is the real
intention of the agent (“intended intention”), while the intention in the promise can
merely be described as non-real. If the dominant intention should be rescinded, a
deception will revert to being a promise, but this is only known to the source.
4.7 Positive promises
A deception is the augmentation of a promise with an incompatible intention. We
should like a name for the augmentation of a promise with a positive intention. We
might call this a positively intended promise, or more briefly a positive promise.
From these slightly strained terms, we can now appreciate why the concept of a
promise is in fact so important. A promise is simply a promise (the documentation of
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an intention), regardless of what lies behind it. Any internal priorities or considerations
are hidden from the view of other agents and cannot be observed. Thus, promises are
an independently important concept because we can (indeed must) talk about promises
without discussing the basis on which they are made.
When a promise is issued, we are neither required nor able to confront the truth or
falsity of the promise. Indeed, as soon as we ask such questions, new issues such as
trust and a plethora of other subjective issues come into play. Such issues are probably
un-resolvable in a logical sense. However, what we assume is here that no matter how
trustworthy a promise might be, it can increase or decrease our certainty of a promised
outcome and thus it bears an influence.
4.8 Promises as specifications in technology
Suppose a user community takes an interest in machines M that compute a function
f from a finite domain D to a finite range R, with the only constraint that for each
d ∈ D, the result r = f(d) satisfies some criterion φ(r, d). Thus for f we have
an implicit definition that is likely to be satisfied by many different implementations.
A provider Pm of these machines may deliver the good (say machine M) in a box
equipped with the following promises: (i) the expected time of computing f(d) is
below Et(d), (ii) the distribution of running times is normal, (iii) the spread is s, and
(iv) energy consumption when running is below e (per unit of time).
Are these four assertions about M best viewed as promises, or is computer science
able to provide a better terminology in this case? We first notice that it is certainly
conceivable that the setting is so complex that it is implausible that any assertions
about M like the mentioned promises can be proven about it as correctness assertions.
This may be the case in spite of the fact that each of these assertions are in essence well-
defined mathematical, logical, or combinatorial, statements. No amount of testing can
compensate for that difficulty. The subjective status of such promises when understood
as propositions or assertions about the behavior of M will not go away simply by not
thinking about them in terms of promises.
A very important flexibility results from viewing these assertions as claims about
M that have been cast as promises. In order to appreciate this flexibility we will make
the plausible assumption that the provider of M has arrived at those claims after due
experimentation, thus giving them initially a status comparable to that of a scientific
hypothesis, at least from the provider’s perspective.
We consider the circumstance that the user community of machines of type M
and of similar competing equipment that has been provided by competing providers in
combination with different packages of promises feels dissatisfied with M in the light
of Pm’s promises. Now the members of the user community have the option to update
their trust in Pm, rather than to contemplate modifications of the promises that P has
made.
It should be noticed that, apart from forgetting entirely about Pm’s promises regard-
ing M , the only alternative way to accommodate their dissatisfaction that is open for
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the members of the user community, is to threat these promises as scientific hypotheses
which must now be updated in a systematic fashion on the basis of new information
gained during usage. But following that systematic path of renewed hypothesis for-
mation is impossible without being given full information on how P arrived at these
opinions in the first place. And such information is likely to be unavailable to the
members of M’s user community.
These remarks serve as an illustration of the principle mentioned in Paragraph 2.3
above.
4.9 A technical refinement of the example
The setting just sketched may seem artificial, but with the following example we will
demonstrate that it makes practical sense. Let 2n represent the set of bit sequences of
length n. SHA-256-512 is the secure hash algorithm SHA-256 applied to 2512 (see [12]
for an authoritative description and [4] for an alternative formalization). We will ab-
breviate SHA-256-512 to h. As a domain D we choose D = 2256×2256, and the range
R is 2256. The criterion φ(d) = φ(d1, d2) works as follows:
φ(d1, d2, r)⇔ bs2n(h(d1 || r)) ≤ bs2n(d2).
Here || denotes string concatenation and bs2n converts elements (bit sequences) of
2256 interpreted as naturals in binary notation with big endian representation to natural
numbers.5
ASIC based machines that compute functions f according to these concrete spec-
ifications, modulo some details, are now on the market as so-called Bitcoin (see [25])
mining tools.6 We claim that viewing claims about these machines put forward by
their providers as promises is convincing.
SHA-256-512 is presented by FIPS (see [12]) as a secure hashing function which
is for that reason supposed to be resistant against so-called first pre-image attacks:
given r ∈ 2256 it is very difficult to find a string d ∈ 2512 with h(d) = r. Although
expressing the algorithmic difficulty of finding d given r as a property of SHA-256-
512 is a mathematical issue in principle, no indication of a proof of the difficulty of
that problem has been found. Nevertheless, the assertion about h that the mentioned
problem is computationally difficult to solve can be qualified as a scientific hypothesis
maintained by the computer science community at large rather than as a promise made
by FIPS.
Nakamoto’s design of Bitcoin turns SHA-256-512 into a parametrized problem
(the Bitcoin mining problem: computing f(d1, d2), necessarily fast in order to win
5Ignoring any knowledge of SHA-256-512 and assuming that it works randomly an estimate of the
probability that some r satisfies the mentioned condition is bs2n(d1) · 2−256. This provides an expec-
tation of the number of inputs that must be tried before a bit sequence r that “solves the combinatorial
problem” is found.
6Such equipment is being sold for instance under the trademarks Avalon and Butterfly.
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a competition and preferably at low energy costs on cheap but dedicated machines in
order to make a profit as well) which is also assumed to be difficult to solve, and which
is assumed to grow exponentially more difficult when the number of leading zeroes of
d2 increases. Otherwise Bitcoin mining will eventually be cracked so to say. In the
absence of a thorough scientific analysis of the Bitcoin mining problem the difficulty
of that problem is probably adequately viewed as a promise made by Nakamoto and
reproduced by the open source developer community around Bitcoin.
4.10 About the philosophical literature on promises
Having worked out a view on promises in this Section, we are in the position to make
some further remarks concerning the connection of non-obligationist promissory the-
ory as advocated above and the plurality of views on promise that has been developed
in philosophy. We will use the illuminating entry on promises in the Stanford Ency-
clopedia on Philosophy as a guide (see [19]). We refer to that survey paper only and
don’t repeat references cited there.
Our non-obligationist promise theory (NOPT) takes accounting for promissory
obligations and measuring their force in comparison to other kinds of obligations for
an issue of secondary pragmatic importance only.
NOPT may be considered a branch of act-consequentialism, and also as a brach
of the expectational theory of promises. In mechanical terms NOPT is connected to
speech act theory and promises may be considerd a sublcass of Searle’s commissions,
and of the illocutions of Austin. Expectationalism portrays a view of promises not
unlike that of NOPT, where trust and modifications of trust are the key parameters
against which promises and promise keeping are measured. NOPT seems to differ
from expectationalist views in not paying attention to whether or not failing to live up
to a promise and thus failing to meet an expectation created by and trusted in connec-
tion with a promise is wrong. Rather than thinking in terms of wrongdoings the future
impact of not keeping a promise on the interaction between promising and trust main-
tenance and its secondary effect on the calculation of expectations from a promisee’s
perspective is considered central in NOPT.
NOPT has been worked out in such a way as to be relevant for automated, or arti-
ficial, agent communities as well as for communities of human agents. For that reason
NOPT has a bias, at least in principle, towards (i) quantitative aspects of the creation
and maintenance of expectation, (ii) logical aspects (informal logic) of reasoning on
the basis of expectation and trust, (iii) trust maintenance and the interaction between
trust and reputation dynamics, (iv) temporal aspects of a promise life-cycle, (v) inter-
action between different promises.
The above focus of NOPT is at cost of a diminished focus on the following aspects:
(i) moral aspects and ethical valuation of actions, (ii) the special status of promissory
obligations (which seem to be rather useless in a world of artificial agents), (iii) the
ramification of speech acts (though NOPT must view a promise as an act of communi-
cation), (iv) promises in relation to contracts (for which the importance of obligations
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is not denied), and with various forms of contractualism and contractarian theory, (v)
relations with Law.
4.10.1 Promises in the philosophy of Law
There is a large body of literature in the philosophy of Law about the role of promises
in general, and in the context of contracts in particular. In [29] the question why
and to what extent keeping a promise ought to be legally enforced is discussed and
seven different views on the matter are distinguished. What matters for us is that the
author takes promising as a given institution and understands the conception of legal
instruments as a variable, rather than the other way around. However, thoughout this
paper promises invariably give rise to expectations, whereas the status of promissory
obligations is much less obvious, though such obligations if any are always connected
to promissory expectations, which conforms to our own viewpoints.
In [11] the case is made that philosophical explanations of why promises are bining
are less critical to the development of contract law than many authors seem to defend.
Instead a notion of efficiency is brought forward which might have greater explanatory
power reading the role of promising.
4.10.2 Promising in anthropology
in [24] the observation is documented that in some communities promising does not
exist because promises are not considered as creating (binding) promissory obliga-
tions, which is taken to be an essential aspect of the institution of promising. We might
turn the message of the paper around and draw the conclusion that there exists anthro-
pologic evidence for the feasibility of human communities with a non-obligationist
conception of the institution of promising.
5 Promise valuation, assessment, reasoning, and logic
In this section we discuss that a promise may have tome value to its promiser as well
as to its promisee. Further the strength of a promise is on display as well as as variety
of assessment methods and finally an embedding of the tropic in “Informal Logic” is
given.
5.1 Promise value
Promises are valuable to agents, because they help to deal with uncertainty. Because
certainty is key, a promise is worth nothing unless there is trust. Zero trust makes
promises worthless. Trust might be based on a history of keeping promises or, in
our terminology, on a history of positive assessments about a succession of promises.
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So there is a symmetry between trust and promises that must be broken to solve the
dilemma.
If there is trust, a promise about future behaviour does not need to be perceived as
an obligation on the promiser but as an indication that best effort will be respected. If
a given agent X does not trust the promiser however, it might assume that the promise
implies an obligation on the promiser. This perception of obligation by X does not of
course imply an obligation perceived by the promiser. There is a fundamental subjec-
tivity in these perceptions.
The value of a promise to any agent in its scope is an expectation of the eventual
benefit. Suppose, then thatA promisesB 400 dollars per year. B promises to washA’s
windows at this price. Both are satisfied with the value they get from this arrangement
and prefer not to question it too much as this could unleash all kinds of consequences.
Observer C can see that the values are quite mismatched, or that A is getting a poor
deal by its judgement, but C also cannot deny that the relationship is stable because
both A and B are happy.
5.2 Promise strength
The above example illustrates that once promises are made and have been noticed by
an audience consisting of agents in its scope, these agents engage in a process of trust
management. The strength, or force, of a promise, viewed from the perspective of an
agent in its scope, quantifies the expectation that it will be kept. The same promise
may have different strength for different members of its audience, and the evolution of
that strength may differ between agents with different experiences. Promise strength
combines (i) a promisee’s promise independent trust in the promiser, (ii) the credibility
of the promise (given the promiser), and (iii) the promise type related trust of the
promisee in the promiser.
It must be stressed, however, that the promiser, the promisee, and all agents in
scope are individually responsible for their management of the strength they attribute to
a promise. Aggregate trust management may be used, but is is necessarily a voluntary
matter for all agents involved.
5.3 Assessments
The notion of whether promises are kept or not is central to their sustained usefulness
in any application domain, thus we need to make mention of how this comes about
in a theory of promises. It would be possible to go overboard and delve into the
complexities of observation and measurement tin an attempt to provide a satisfactory
answer but that is not in the spirit of this paper. We seek instead a simpler notion which
is at the same level of abstraction as the concepts of promise and intention that we have
introduced thus far. We call this the concept of assessment.
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Term 17 (Assessment) An assessment is a subjective statement made by an agent
about whether the intentions of itself or of another agent were fulfilled.
Our notion of an assessment is more generic and less quantitative than a verification. It
is both subjective and not a priori linked to observation. In a static theory of promises
and intentions the existence of intentions as well as the value of assessments is linked
to state parameters like time. Thus, for an intention of agent A, in existence at time t,
and known to be by way of a promise that A had issued before t, it may be the case
that agent B’s assessment, made at time t′ > t is positive (or negative).
At this level of description, we need not say any more about it than this. What
is important is how a witness to the promise assesses the fate of the promise. Such
an assessor may or may not feel obliged to assess a resulting state or activity in a
particular way, might promise to conform to certain criteria, and so on. What matters
is only the assessment, which might or might not be rationally obtained. We believe
that this is a fair model of the world in which we live.
Assessment involves a variety of possible routes to inference, i.e. there are different
kinds of assessment. This is a subjective issue, but this should not be viewed as a
weakness of our theory, it is an important feature of the subjective nature of individual
assessment.
5.4 Promise related reasoning processes
Promise descriptions are symbolic representations of actions, and events and states
of affairs that allow systematic transformation processes. Transforming the physical
representation of a symbolic description of a promise might be considered an instance
of reasoning.
The logical complexity of promises becomes apparent by taking into account the
diversity of reasoning processes related to a single promise that are performed by
promiser, promisee, and agents in scope of that promise.
The following reasoning processes can be distinguished in relation to a single
promise p with promiser A, body X , promisee B and with agent C in its scope (C
may be equal to B). We assume that some representation of P and its components,
or of components in a stage of preparation of P is available to an agent that performs
reasoning about it. No analysis is suggested of the means of representation used, but
this range will include mental representation as it occurs within an animate agent and
also formal representation amenable for some formal reasoning process as it may be
implemented within an inanimate intelligent agent.
Promise preparation: a reasoning process performed byA leading to the design, tim-
ing and issuing of p by A.
Credibility analysis: a reasoning process where agents C in scope of p determine the
credibility they assign to A’s promising p in the light of general facts known of
24
A (but excluding specific historical information about the individual behavior of
A as a member of its agent class.)
Prior trust determination: reasoning processes performed by C (provided that C is
in the scope of p) aimed at (i) determining the trust C had in A before becoming
aware of p (C’s prior trust in A), and (ii) specifying which expectations are
generated by taking notice of p.
Counter-promise deliberation: reasoning processes performed byB concerning plau-
sible counter-promises that may be issued in by B reply of taking notice of p
(provided B is in scope of p).
Promise impact prediction: (this may be done with the understanding that B has is-
sued one or more plausible counter-promises) (i) reasoning processes performed
by B (when in scope of p) and by C (any agent in scope of p) aimed at determin-
ing the (change of) expectation (as viewed by B resp. C) that p creates in B (and
that A intended to generate), (ii) and reasoning processes aimed at modification
of plans (held by B or by C) given the change of expectations held by each of
them that was brought about by taking notice of p.
Promise assessment: reasoning processes performed by C concerning (i) the way in
which C will assess whether or not A’s promise is kept, (ii) assessing the latter
by means of the preferred assessment method.
Promise withdrawal monitoring: A may at some later stage issue another promise,
say q, the keeping of which is not compatible with keeping p. It that case q
qualifies as a withdrawal of p. An agent C applies a reasoning process that
monitors and evaluates subsequent promises issued by A to determine whether
these may be viewed as breaking p to an extent that p may be considered having
been withdrawn.
Trust updating: reasoning processes in place for each agent C in scope of p. The
process aims at updating C’s prior trust in A in accordance with the result of the
assessment C makes concerning the degree of keeping p that is achieved by A.
Reputation processing: a reasoning processes performed by each agent C in scope
of p aimed at exchanging the effects of trust updates between different agents.
Reputation flow permits an agent C while having no prior trust assessment of
an agent A to acquire an initial trust of A by taking notice of evidence gathered
about A by other agents.
5.5 Promise related informal logic
Connections between promises and informal logic are of a diverse nature. Such con-
nections admit a general classification. Here are four forms of such connections that
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may be imagined, the first three of which may be considered relevant in the case of
promises:
Promises as a contribution to informal logic: Promises considered an additional en-
try in the catalogue of entities that are central for informal logic.
Viewpoints from informal logic supporting promise theory: Definition and demar-
cation of the concept of a promise profiting from existing developments in infor-
mal logic.
Methods of informal logic applied to promise dynamics: Promise related reasoning
mechanisms have in common that a strict formalization is implausible. A signif-
icant variation between promise related reasoning patterns for individual agents
is plausible. This variation is a feature of informal logic rather than of formalized
logic.
Promises as an alternative to (parts of) informal logic: We are not aware of parts
of informal logic that would profit from being rewritten in the language of
promises.
5.5.1 Specific links between promises and informal logic
Concerning these three forms of connections that matter in the case of promises the
following more specific remarks can be made:
1. Promises are utterances like remarks, questions, announcements, replies, and
obligations.7 Special of promises is the dynamic interplay with credibility and
trust. Issuing a promise differs from producing a statement in discourse (dialecti-
cal use), or from making an argument (alethic use), or from rhetorical language
(though rhetoric may involve promises and deceptive promises). We mention
[27] for an application of this distinction. In that paper reason for action are
studied in detail, and reasons for issuing a promise can be considered a subtopic
within that theme worth of independent investigation.
2. Credibility assessment may involve reasoning by analogy (similar agents have
kept similar promises in similar circumstances and therefore there promise is
credible), and arguments from authority (another highly regarded agent claims
that the promise is credible). Pattern matching techniques may be used to sup-
port an agent in finding similarities that allow for comparative assessment of
credibility. The form of reasoning is similar to “story similarity” as discussed
in [36].
7While an obligation is not a speech act and not the result of a speech act a promise is likely to be the
result of a speech act. The dynamos of obligations and promises differs. Such differences an be found
with utterance types remark, question, announcement, reply, and (to a lesser extent) prediction as well.
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3. Trust assessment may involve arguments from authority and as well as various
forms of probabilistic and plausible reasoning. We mention [33] which deals
with systematic reasoning given the absence of evidence, a very plausible con-
dition for agents who need to assess trust in a promising agent. Many examples
of trust based reasoning are given in [28]. Although that paper focuses on trust
as a human behavioral or mental feature most examples make sense in a context
of artificial examples just as well. In [35] one finds an analysis of detecting and
avoiding circular reasoning when establishing or updating trust.
4. Both trust and credibility are conveyed and created through a combination of
network based reputation development, which is an instance of distributed rea-
soning from authority, and distributed plausible reasoning.
5.5.2 Nonlogical processing of promise bodies
Agents aware of promises that have been issued will perform processing on the basis
of their own local representations of promise statements. From a symbolic perspective
this involves symbolic processing on (representations of) promise types and promise
bodies.
But there seems to be no need for a notion of validity for the processing of promise
statement representations that is performed by agents in scope of a promise. Whether
or not promising works out well to the extent that it is of sustained use in some context
is a learning outcome by agents who may act as promisers and promisees.
Besides alethic use, dialectical use, and rhetorical use, a behavioral use is conceiv-
able. Behavioral use of promises does away with a principled approach to the promise
types and the meaning of promise bodies as well as with valid reasoning on the basis
of these ingredients and admits any form of associative processing by agents involved
that suits their objectives.
6 Promises versus obligations
The importance of the notion of promises may be questioned by those who consider
promises as a concept secondary to obligations. If one views obligations as the pri-
mary concept, the value or importance of promises unavoidably shrinks. We shall now
survey advantages and disadvantages of obligations as an alternative cornerstone of a
theory of multi-agent systems. The discussion will be somewhat asymmetric because
we will not base our comparison on a proper definition of the concept of an obligation
(which we cannot fathom).
Having explained intentions and promises, let us now try to describe the notion of
obligations in the same manner. The intuitive notion of an obligation seems straight-
forward, but it proves to have difficult properties. We refer to Jackson & Altham [22]
for a convincing exposition of these complications.
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We might try to think of obligations in a straightforward way, for instance: an
obligation is an intention that is perceived to be necessary by an agent. This certainly
captures some of the characteristics that we understand by the term, but it also leaves
many questions unanswered: is the feeling of the necessity voluntary or forced, a
matter of survival or simply an authoritarian convention?
An obligation, or more precisely the impact of an obligation in general, as felt by
an agent within its scope, falls into the category of possible intentions. We will speak
of an induced intention, the intention being achieving compliance with the obligation.
The induced intention must have source, a target and a body, and the body must have a
quality and a quantity. The source and target are now somewhat difficult to understand
however. Unclear is further to what extent an induced intention is current, and if so if it
is a commitment. Can it be indifferent, or even a deception or simply invalid? Beyond
this, we shall not attempt to define obligations more carefully in this paper. We shall
merely state some assumptions about them.
An obligation can be imposed by external conditions, e.g. by the expected be-
haviour of external agents, by laws threatening sanctions etc, or it can be self-imposed
by codes of personal behaviour which an agent holds to be necessary. But this imposi-
tion suggests the action of a force which attempts to induce a commitment in another
agent (or itself). An obligation is a possible intention which may or may not be current
and may or may not have the status of a commitment. In any case the agent is aware
of any compelling reasons to include the intention in the portfolio of commitments,
either from within itself or without due to external forces.
It seems natural then to refer to the source and target of the induced intention as
being the agent in which one attempts to induce the intention, and the recipient of
the intention respectively. However, the source of the obligation itself might not be
an agent at all, but merely a set of external conditions, norms, experiences or other
information acquired by the agent that lead to a perceived priority.
Note again that even ‘forced’ behaviour can be classified under the realms of (pos-
sible) intentions since all behaviour can be intended. Again, we emphasize that this
does not imply that a coerced agent holds the intention that is being forced upon it.
Nor does it say anything about whether the agent is able to resist the force or not, or
whether it matters if an obligation is self-imposed or externally imposed.
Viewed from the perspective of an agent, the notion of an obligation immediately
seems significantly more complicated than an intention or a promise and does not seem
to be close to the notion of either promises or intentions.
We hold that obligations are far from being a reliable tool for ensuring compliance.
If a law-giver wanted to ensure the compliance of an agent, a better strategy would
be to obtain a promise from the agent, and to convince it to view the intention as
a commitment since the law-giver could never know whether the agent had indeed
committed to the body of the obligation.
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6.1 Obligation strength
Obligations can be assigned a measure or degree of strength from the perspective of an
audience just as promises. When assessing the strength of an obligation an agent will
first of all estimate the degree to which an obligation applies to its own context, rather
than the degree to which the obliging entity is entitled to do so.
The divergence between promise strength and obligation strength appress strik-
ingly when one appreciates that, unlike promise strength, obligation strength has little
to do with expectations and is nearly independent of future action of any agent in-
volved.
6.2 Potential prominence of promises
Our belief in restricted strong non-obligationism implies that conceptually separat-
ing promises from obligations is a starting point of our work. Viewed as utterances
promises must further be separated from other utterances such as informative utter-
ances, questions, predictions, and commands.
If an agent A expresses a fact, say F , meant to be informative for an audience, the
similarity with A promising F is significant. However, when stating F , agent A may
not be able, or have been able in the past, to exercise its influence to bring about that
F holds true. While it is always acceptable that an agent acts in such a way that its
promises are kept, the same is not always valid for informative statements.
For instance: an agent telling an employer that “he will not be present tomorrow
because of a flu” need not be absent if the flu fails to hit as expected. Such a message
implies no single action that increases its plausibility. What may get lost when viewing
informative utterances as promises is objectivity. This provides a clear separation,
and at the same time it indicates that in systems that do not measure or assess agent
objectivity it is unproblematic to treat each informative utterance as a promise.
When agent A asks question q to another agent, say B, in the scope of an audi-
ence, then the corresponding utterance need not be considered a promise. Indeed for
understanding the notion of a question one has no need of promises. In other words as
concepts promises are not prior to questions. Nevertheless it is quite plausible to re-
place the question by an utterance where A promisesB some reward uponB providing
an answer to q.
Finally, if agent A issues a command c to agent B in scope S, then like with
questions as just mentioned, in order to understand what is going one has no need of
the concept of a promise. Having said that, however, again it is plausible that A’s
command is replaced by a promise that A will provide some reward if B acts as if it
puts command c into effect. Suggesting this replacement is plausible in particular if
one has no interest in obligations that might result from the issuing of a command.
We find that promises stand out as the utterances from which all other communi-
cations can be derived. This gives promissory utterances some conceptual prominence
of other utterances.
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6.3 For and against the primacy of obligations
Invariably, however promises are linked with obligations. By the sheer weight of tradi-
tion, obligations dominate discussions of behaviour. Our object is to position promises
as a major tool for the specification and the regulation of behavior. For that reason
we make an attempt to compare promises and obligations as conceptual tools for dis-
tributed systems design.
6.3.1 In favour of obligations
We begin with listing some arguments in favor of obligations as regulatory mechanism
when compared with promises.
1. Some people might think that a promise is an obligation because it seems to
create one, and might therefore be considered equivalent to that obligation. (This
is a version of obligationism to which we oppose.)
2. Obligations are a well known concept from deontic logic. There is an advantage
to to reducing the less well-known concept of promises to one that has been
studied for more than fifty years. (This is true, but it implies no more than that
promises are worth studying.)
3. Obligations have a formal status in state laws and regulations. There is no such
public body of promises. (Promises are a dynamic phenomenon concurrent with
autonomous action, listing promises globally and statically is not plausible.)
4. Many obligations give rise to promises which occur in the process of fulfilling
an obligation. E.g. the cat must get fed while owner is on holiday, the owner
is obliged to get the cat fed (by law forbidding cruelty to animals). A friend
promises to help in the fulfillment of the obligation. (This is true but it does not
imply that obligations are prior to promises in general.)
6.3.2 Against obligations
When balancing obligations and promises as a regulatory mechanism for distributed
systems significant arguments in favor of promises can be mentioned.
1. Obligations have their own complex logic, that is on philosophical grounds some
combinations of obligations are less plausible. Seemingly simple deontic logic
still captures (or hides) a wealth of moral dilemmas and ethical mysteries. We
refer to Holbo [21] for a strategies for dealing with inconsistent obligations.
2. Much more than obligations promises provide a tool for the self-organization
of a community of autonomous agents. At any stage, and concerning any fu-
ture cooperative activity, agents can start exchanging promises thereby creating
an increasingly complex and functional promise graph which may eventually
provide a basis for usable expectation assessments.
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3. Once issued a promise admits a dynamically maintained equilibrium between
the expectation of the promise being kept and with credibility of and trust in the
promiser. Such balancing tradeoffs are absent with obligations.
4. It is easy to imagine a significant plurality of promises constituting a promise
graph related to a single planned activity. It is counterproductive to explain such
promises in terms of equally many obligations.
5. Suppose one has the concepts of promise available, and now reflects upon obli-
gations. An agent Pissue:ob issuing an obligation with body bob to all agents Q in
a scope S, might be understood as simultaneously promising all members Q of
S that Pissue:ob will act in such a way as if P had received a promise with body
Bob from Q.
This is a reasonable explanation of what may happen when issuing an obligation
and it explains why obligations seem to be complex entities or events from the
perspective of promises.
6. If a future promise (e.g. the promise to feed the cat in the future) is in fact a
deception then this falsifies the necessity of a relationship between promises and
obligations. In other words, all intentions occurring as apparent intentions in
promises cannot be induced obligations because some promises can be decep-
tions and these cannot be (easily) understood as induced obligations.
7. Similarly, not all promises are about future actions, so there cannot be an implied
obligation capturing its essence for all promises. E.g. I promise that the cat got
fed. Indeed the owner might actually be displeased that the cat was fed if it was
supposed to be dieting.
8. There is a dissimilarity between promises and obligations. They are quite dif-
ferent entities. Obligations may cause promises and promises may cause obliga-
tions, but promises have a physical reality as events in space and time, whereas
obligations do not. Obligations are at a different level of abstraction altogether.
9. Promises are made on a voluntary basis. For obligation however, the concept of
voluntarity is almost irrational. In any case it might be voluntary to imply an
obligation on someone else, but engaging in a promise you may face an involun-
tary obligation or a voluntary one. Voluntarity is therefore natural for promises
but is quite problematic for obligations.
10. Promise announcement constitutes positive extensions of user behaviour, whereas
obligations primarily constitute a negative constraint on the degrees of freedom
of the obliged party.
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6.3.3 Promises precede obligations; locality precedes globality
If one would choose between promises and obligations, it seems abundantly clear that
promises are the simpler concept, or perhaps the more primitive concept. It is hard to
imagine a world without promising while one may imagine a world without obliga-
tions.
In addition the concept of a promise seems more natural in the technological world:
since computers cannot feel ethical responsibility, the reduction to promises to obliga-
tions seems to be neither philosophically satisfactory nor technically correct.
So far we have argued that promises are different, simpler and can be analyzed
independently of obligations. There is one more point that is of principal practical
importance. Promises are local constructions, whereas obligations are non-local. The
source of a promise is localized in a single entity that has all of the information and
self-control to be available to resolve conflicts and problems with multiple promises.
The sources of obligations however are distributed amongst many individuals and the
obliged party does not have the access to resolve the conflicts without maintaining a
voluntary dialogue with all of these multiple parties.
From a practical viewpoint, obligations are simply less effective at reducing un-
certainty because they tend to increase uncertainty not reduce it. Indeed, obligations
can be inconsistent, but promises cannot. More precisely: consistency of promises is
a matter that can be verified at the level of sources only. Promises made by different
agents cannot be inconsistent if promise bodies are dealing with actions or states of
affairs about which the promiser has an overriding control against other agents. If dif-
ferent agents issue conflicting promises at least one of these fails to have the expected
degree of control. In any case once such conflicting promise are noticed the trust in
both issuers needs reconsideration, and a decrease in trust in at least one of the promise
agents is likely to occur.
Preferably then one would not use obligation as a coordination principle if a mech-
anism based on promises can be used instead.
7 Conclusions
We have restricted our attention to static scenarios in this work, as the matter of change
is a complex one. An account of how promises arrive, persist and are removed again
is forthcoming. Some work has already been done in this area, however, in [2] and in
[8] but scope for embellishment is vast, as is the number applications for the concept
of promises. In the latter reference, the matter of organization is related to promises,
as a form of cooperation between individuals or autonomous agents.
Although we have avoided describing specific and detailed scenarios or using the
notion of agent autonomy in this work, one of us has written extensively on the view-
point that promises represent a basis for a sound engineering discipline, somewhat
analogous to an “atomic theory”, where arbitrary systems can be reduced to indepen-
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dent agents that issue promises about their behaviour [6]. This sets about a process of
documentation of independent properties that can be helpful in detailing one’s under-
standing of observed phenomena. Indeed, in computing in particular there is a genuine
case to be made for viewing a computer as a number of independent electrical compo-
nents that make quite specific promises to one another.
Given the role promises have in influencing certainty, an exploration of the re-
lationship to causation and fault propagation networks seems fruitful. Similarly the
benefits in economics are obvious.
Outside computing undoing promises from their obligation generating effects can
be a helpful to strengthen the role of promises as an organizational principle. This may
provide a fruitful direction for management science research.
Without attempting to suggest applications in any field, we have argued for the
usefulness of promises as an independent and practical concept, whether in philoso-
phy, economics or technology. We have compared promises to the more usual idea
of obligations and have concluded unequivocally that promises are a simpler theoret-
ical notion and a more practical tool than obligations in the reduction of an agent’s
uncertainty about the behaviour of other agents.
We show that intentions, promises, and commitments can be introduced and to a
significant extent explained in the absence of an understanding of obligations. Fur-
thermore, although it seems to be a common view that obligations are a more primitive
concept than promises, our paper suggests the contrary. Promises need not be viewed
merely as proxies for obligations; if promises give rise to obligations, this can in fact
be studied purely in an exposition based on promises, intentions and commitments.
Indeed more often than not promises are made by agents who would not be able to
explain the extent to which their promises might lead to obligations or not, or to what
extent such obligations would be more significant than the promises from which they
arose.
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